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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Respondent submits that the issue to be resolved is 
more narrow than that proposed by the Appellant. Specifically, 
the issue for resolution is whether the existing law in Utah, 
which does not recognize a tort action in favor of an uninjured 
spouse for loss of consortium due to injuries to one's spouse, 
should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
Lori Cruz brought a tort action against Jed Wright for 
loss of consortium arising out of injuries to her husband sus-
tained in an automobile accident with Mr. Wright in Utah County 
in 1982. 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
Nicholas A. Cruz, husband of appellant, filed a com-
plaint on December 7, 1983, against Jed Wright for injuries 
sustained in an auto accident in December, 1982. (R., p. 1) 
This complaint was amended on July 10, 1984, to add the claim for 
loss of consortium by Lori Cruz. (R., p. 36) Defendant made a 
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Motion to Dismiss or for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on 
November 1, 1984, to strike the claim of Mrs, Cruz. (R., p. 
50) The Court granted the defendant's Motion on the first day of 
trial on December 10, 1984. (R., p. 260) On December 17, 1984, 
the jury found for the plaintiff, Mr. Cruz. (R., p. 264) Formal 
judgment upon the verdict and the dismissal was entered by the 
District Court on January 4, 1985. (R., p. 269) Plaintiff filed 
her Notice of Appeal on February 1, 1985. (R., p. 275) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A jury found that Jed Wright proximately caused the 
injuries of Nicholas A. Cruz in an automobile accident occurring 
in Utah County on December 23, 1982. (R., p. 264) Respondent 
does not deny that Lori Cruz is the wife of Nicholas Cruz but 
does deny that any loss of consortium occurred or was proximately 
caused by Jed Wright. (R., p. 39) 
As the claim of Mrs. Cruz was dismissed as a matter of 
law without a hearing upon the merits, respondent is unaware of 
any other operative facts. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent propounds the following arguments in support 
of his position: 
1. There is no question that other states recognize 
loss of consortium as a cause of action. Utah's minority posi-
tion is, however, consistent with the historical development of 
the law and is not a minority position in the sense of being 
wrong or outdated. 
2. Legislatures have always been free to change common 
law rights subject to particular limitations which the appellant 
has failed to establish as applicable. 
3. The doctrine of stare decisis controls this case 
and there is no sufficient reason to vary from its application. 
4. Recognition of loss of consortium as an element of 
damage rather than an independent cause of action harmonizes 
appellant's alleged inconsistencies in the current law and pro-
vides this Court with an alternative resolution less drastic than 
overruling prior cases and striking down statutes. 
5. Should this Court choose to overrule the existing 
law, the burden created upon this defendant is sufficient to 
justify prospective application only of the new cause of action. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant seeks to overturn the long-standing rule of 
law in Utah that loss of consortium is not a cause of action in 
one whose spouse was injured in some unfortunate incident with a 
tortfeasor. As explained fully in Appellant's brief, this rule 
has existed in Utah since at least 1898. 
A close reading of Appellant's brief shows that its 
logic may be reduced to four steps. First, a husband had a 
common law right to loss of consortium if the wife was injured, 
but the wife had no comparable interest in the husband. Second, 
the legislature recognized the inequality of no right to loss of 
consortium in the wife and remedied it by eliminating the 
husband's right to recovery. Third, the legislature exceeded its 
authority to abrogate the common law in eliminating the husband's 
right. Therefore, the legislative action abrogating the 
husband's right to recovery for loss of consortium should be set 
aside and both spouses should be made equal before the law by 
creating an action for loss of consortium in the wife. 
The logic of Appellant does not stand scrutiny for 
several reasons. First, it is well-settled that the legislature 
may abrogate the common law. Second, the legislature's choice of 
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method to remedy the inequality which existed with regard to 
consortium was clearly within the recognized discretion of the 
legislature. Thirdf there is no compelling reason to reverse the 
existing case law upon the point. These responses are examined 
in more detail below. 
All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
I. 
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LOSS OP 
CONSORTIUM SUPPORTS THE CURRENT UTAH POSITION 
Appellant has adequately explained that the Married 
Women's Acts, of which Section 30-2-4 is part, were adopted to 
remedy the inequality in the law arising from the common law 
doctrine that the wife was the property of the husband and had no 
property interest in the husband's support and society. The 
legislature recognized the social evil of the common law and 
chose to remedy it by denying the action to the husband. Appel-
lant is correct that other states chose to implement equality by 
creating the action in the wife. 
The creation of equality in husband and wife with 
regard to consortium by the Utah Legislature in 1898 actually 
placed the state as a leader in establishing that equality. 
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Other states maintained the unequal status until the years 
following 1950. It was then that the courts of the District of 
Columbia held that a wife could recover for loss of consortium as 
could a husband* Hitaffer v. Argonne Co,, 183 P.2d 811 (D.C. 
App. 1950). As a perusal of the appendix to the Appellant's 
brief shows, at page 34, the dates other states found equality 
for consortium are very recent. 
The recent finding of equality in the other states, so 
heavily relied upon by Appellant, is extremely important to the 
resolution of whether Utah's current rule has become dated. At 
least one commentator has concluded that the reason other states 
chose to create the action in the wife rather than eliminate the 
loss of consortium in the husband was because the husband's 
action was so ingrained in their law that abrogation of the 
husband's action would disrupt their jurisprudence. Amick, "Who 
Should Recover For Loss Of Consortium?", 3 5 Maine L. Rev. 296 
(1982) at 301. 
If the Court properly considers this issue under the 
state of the law today, there is no compelling reason to create 
the right to seek recovery for loss of consortium in a wife 
because the justification of the other states, i.e., that the 
husband's right is well ingrained in Utah law, is absent. The 
husbands of Utah have not had such an action since at least 1898, 
only two years after statehood. 
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Because the historical context of this current case is 
completely different from that of the other states at the time 
they considered how to best create equality between spouses for 
loss of consortium, this Court need not be concerned that the 
majority rule is contrary to the current position of Utah law. 
II. 
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 30-2-4 WAS 
WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATURE 
A. Correct Rule of Law. 
Appellant's argument that the legislature cannot abro-
gate a common law right is simply incorrect. That argument, if 
strictly applied, would obviously lock the law of Utah into an 
18th or 19th century concept of jurisprudence. 
Utah adopted the common law through §68-3-1. That 
statute is clear that the common law is adopted subject "to the 
laws of this state". It was intended from the very beginning of 
common law in this State that the legislature could change it. 
See, Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096 (1915). 
In fact, legislatures have frequently found it approp-
riate to eliminate common law rights. The Utah Legislature has, 
in §75-2-113, eliminated the rights of Dower and Curtesy. This 
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Court had no trouble finding the legislature's authority to 
abrogate Dower in Hilton v. Thatcher 31 Utah 360, 88 P. 20 
(1906). Similarly, §76-1-105 abolishes one's right to be pro-
tected from criminal activity under the common law in favor of a 
criminal code based entirely upon statute. 
Appellant fails to consider §68-3-2, wherein the legis-
lature makes clear that statutes are to be construed to prevail 
over the common law. Adopted in 1898, this statute reflects a 
long existing policy in this state that the common law is subject 
to change. (See Addendum) 
Other states have not had difficulty in finding the 
power of the legislature to abrogate common law rights. For 
example, in Lyon v. Bush, 412 P.2d 662 (Hawaii 1966), the legis-
lature was recognized as having the authority to abolish the 
common law action of breach of promise to marry. Eighteen states 
and the District of Columbia have abolished the common law action 
for alienation of affection. See note 3, Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). Finally, though it has not yet occurred, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that the Wyoming Legis-
lature may eliminate a consortium claim in the husband or create 
one in the wife. Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971). 
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B. Constitutional Considerations. 
The Appellant's statement that the legislature cannot 
eliminate a common law right falls short of correctly stating the 
law. Consequently, Appellant attempts to find a prohibition on 
abrogation of the common law in the access to courts article of 
the Utah Constitution. 
The plain language of Article 1, Section 11, makes 
clear that the purpose of this section is to insure that the 
citizens of the state have access to the court for recognized 
legal injury. There is no expressed intent to lock in existing 
rights. 
Other states have similarly interpreted their open 
access provisions in state constitutions. In O'Quinn v. Walt 
Disney Productions, Inc., 493 P.2d 344 (Colo. 1972), it was held 
that the Colorado Constitution did not prevent the legislature 
from affecting recognized rights, but simply provided access to 
the courts to enforce rights. Montana reached the same conclu-
sion long ago in Stewart v. Standard Pub. Co., 55 P.2d 694 (Mont. 
1936). The same interpretation was applied to Oklahoma's con-
stitution in Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d 1335 (Okla. App. 1974). 
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The cases cited by Appellant in support of the propo-
sition that the state constitution open access provision limits 
the legislature's power were not decided incorrectly, but improp-
erly relied upon by the Appellant, Appellant's brief pp. 10-
13. Those cases assume and recognize that the causes of action 
concerned exist in law. What the cases strike down are arti-
ficial procedural or other barriers to bringing the action. No 
artificial barriers exist here. To the contrary, the legislature 
adopted §30-2-4 to eliminate legal barriers to the full equality 
of women before the law by completely eliminating an action 
founded in common law. This step was forward in social progress, 
not backward as Appellant suggests. 
III. 
THERE IS NO APPARENT REASON TO AVOID THE 
APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF STARE DECISIS 
A. Stare Decisis in Utah. 
As this Court is fully aware, the rule of stare decisis 
is intended to bring stability and predictability to the law. 
There is no question that in appropriate cases this Court may set 
a new direction on some point of law. Considerable deference is, 
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however, due the precedent which is challenged. See Ramirez v. 
Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955) at 464. 
Obviously, before overruling established precedent, 
this Court ought to make reference to some legal standard to 
determine whether the case is appropriate to enter a new legal 
position or whether the rule of stare decisis should prevail. 
Utah has not yet fully developed its judicial standard for break-
ing with the doctrine of stare decisis. In Austad v. Austad, 2 
Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954), this Court reversed a line of 
decisions concerning alimony where the old rule was found to be 
unjust, plainly in error, and without "firm footing" in the law. 
In Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d 
756 (Utah 1951), the Court considered the application of the rule 
of stare decisis and established law concerning the power of a 
school board. The Court, at 765, indicated that the application 
of stare decisis was in large part dependent upon the nature of 
the question being considered. The language of the opinion 
indicates that where the question arises out of a legislative 
decision, those cases arising thereunder ought to be followed 
until the legislature saw fit to change the rule. Having stated 
that general principle, the Court went on to reverse former 
precedent based upon the particular facts of that case. 
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3. Applicable Precedent. 
That §30-2-4 eliminates loss of consortium as a cause 
of action in Utah is a principle well-established in Utah case 
law. The language of Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P. 2d 
985 (1972), is clear that this statute places husband and wife on 
an equal basis by eliminating the common law right of action for 
loss of consortium in the husband. 
Ellis does not stand alone. It was followed most 
recently in Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979). There, a 
husband's claim for loss of consortium was dismissed, as in 
this case, when only the wife was injured. Corbridge v. M. 
Morrin & Son, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967), held that 
§30-2-4 barred a husband from collecting his losses due to his 
wife's injuries. The court held that the loss of the wife's 
services were a part of her claim against the defendant. 
C. The Current Interpretation of §30-2-4 is Well-Founded. 
Appellant's brief fails to show that the standard for 
avoiding the rule of stare decisis in this case has been met. 
There is no showing that the interpretation of §30-2-4 in Ellis, 
Tjas, or Corbridge is unjust or works some evil in a legal sense. 
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The current consortium rule found in the cases de-
scribed above arises from a legislative enactment. That legis-
lative act has been shown above to be within the power of the 
legislature. Certainly, the legislature was aware of how the 
court has interpreted §30-2-4. If such interpretations by this 
Court were incorrect or not within the intent of the legislature, 
it could have been corrected long ago. 
There is no question that the objective of creating 
equality under the law for wives was a legitimate legislative 
goal. Appellant is, in effect, asking this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the legislature in achieving this goal 
of equality under the law. As the Court articulated in Bradshaw 
v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972), this Court 
ought not to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature 
in picking alternative courses of action unless it is outside the 
legislature's authority or the action taken is found to be arbit-
rary and capricious. 
The choice of the legislature to abolish the action to 
achieve equality between husband and wife is not arbitrary and 
capricious, but is simply a choice between alternative courses of 
action. Because plaintiff is a woman, it is ironic that she 
attacks §30-2-4. Women did not have the cause of action prior to 
1898. Appellant is in the position of complaining about a 
statute that was adopted to benefit women generally. 
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Appellant attempts to find some importance in the fact 
that Utah law allows for recovery for loss of consortium in a 
wrongful death case, but does not for a personal injury case. 
Appellant's reliance upon Article XVI, Section 5, of the Utah 
Constitution, is peculiar because that language clearly implies 
that the legislature may choose to abrogate a right of recovery 
for loss of consortium. This implication arises from the lang-
uage prohibiting the legislature from abrogating the right to 
bring a wrongful death action, thus implying the right to abro-
gate an action for damages otherwise remains in the legisla-
ture. (See Addendum for text) 
The Utah Constitution does not specifically provide for 
loss of consortium damages in a wrongful death suit. Rather, as 
Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982), makes clear, recovery 
for loss consortium has been allowed in the wrongful death action 
of a child because of the historical development of the law 
surrounding the economic value of a child. Consequently, the 
choice of the legislature in addressing consortium differently is 
consistent when viewed in light of the historical development of 
each position. That is, it was reasonable for the legislature to 
establish equality in wives by banning the husband's cause of 
action and it was reasonable for Utah law to allow recovery of 
loss of consortium upon the death of a child to overcome the fact 
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that a child had little economic value under the common method of 
measuring damages. 
The allegation by Appellant that the legislature has 
acted inconsistently also ignores the holding in Tjasf supra. 
Again, the court held therein that while the uninjured spouse 
does not have a claim for loss of consortium, certain elements of 
consortium, in this case loss of services of the injured spouse, 
were recoverable as part of the loss of the injured party. 
Rather than the Utah position of loss of consortium 
being an aberration in American jurisprudence, as the Appellant 
suggests, Tjas has been praised by one commentator as represent-
ing, perhaps, one of the more enlightened and progressive views 
concerning consortium. See Amick "Who Should Recover For Loss Of 
Consortium?" 35 Maine L. Rev. 295 at 310-311. 
As Amick implies, Utah's position is progressive be-
cause the essence of the current status of the Utah law regarding 
loss of consortium is to recognize that consortium is not an 
individual interest, but rather a family interest. Therefore, 
the action for loss of consortium remains in the injured party as 
an element of damage rather than a separate cause of action. 
The view that loss of consortium is an element of 
damages removes the Appellant's alleged inconsistency between the 
wrongful death acts and §30-2-4. That is, the damaged family 
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interest can be recovered by the injured party as would the 
plaintiff in a wrongful death action. 
Respondent suggests that this case presents this Court 
with the opportunity to clarify the prior cases discussed rather 
than overrule them. The Court can recognize that the legislature 
lawfully acted to eliminate loss of consortium as an individual 
action in favor of a family interest which may be an element of 
damage solely in the injured party. This result harmonizes the 
Wrongful Death Statute, the Married Women's Acts, Tjas, and the 
other cases discussed. Appellant is then properly left with no 
loss of consortium claim, which belongs to her husband, the 
injured party. 
IV. 
SHOULD THE COURT OVERRULE THE CURRENT RULE 
OF LAW CONCERNING LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, THE 
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE RETROACTIVE TO 
INCLUDE THESE PARTIES 
The applicable rules governing whether an overruling 
decision has retroactive operation was examined by this Court in 
Loyal Order of Moose, No. 259 v. County Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). There, the Court 
determined that retroactive operation of an overruling decision 
is the usual result. However, this general rule is not binding 
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upon the Court and the Court retains discretion to apply an 
overruling decision prospectively where some burden is created. 
Should the Court adopt the Appellant's position as the 
new law of the state, several factors need to be considered in 
determining the retroactivity of the decision. Clearly, this 
defendant raised a proper motion according to the settled law in 
effect at the time of the trial. There is, therefore, no issue 
as to the good faith of the position taken or of the District 
Court's ruling in dismissing the claim. 
Appellant asks the Court to only reverse the rule of 
Utah law that loss of consortium is not recoverable by the unin-
jured spouse. However, this Court, should it decide to reverse 
the current Utah law, must go further by determining the nature 
of the consortium claim. For example, some states hold that the 
action for loss of consortium is a derivative action arising from 
the principal tort. Consequently, the loss of consortium action 
must be joined with the original claim for purposes of trial. 
See Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Deems v. Western 
Maryland Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (1967). Other states have held 
that the uninjured spouse has a consortium claim separate from 
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the injured spouse. Therefore, the actions may be tried separ-
ately. See Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980). Guid-
ance is also needed as to the effect of the comparative negli-
gence doctrine upon the claim of the uninjured spouse. 
This Respondent is not in a position procedurally to 
anticipate the various incidents of the cause of action should it 
be created. Mere reversal is only the beginning. It would be an 
unfair burden on this Respondent to create rules of joinder and 
comparative negligence after the principal claim has been finally 
resolved. Retroactive application of a reversal raises the 
spectre of double recovery. That is, the jury might not have 
awarded the husband the same amount of general damages had they 
before them the claim of the wife for damage concerning loss of 
services and family income. 
A very practical burden is that retroactive application 
of an overruling decision may apply to persons not insured for 
loss of consortium claims. The people of this state may have 
relied upon the state of the law and exercised prudent judgment 
that they need not insure against such claims. To allow retro-
active application of a new cause of action could financially 
destroy defendants in pending cases who relied on consistency of 
the law. 
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Respondent again affirms that overruling the current 
law is inappropriate. However, should the Court choose to create 
a new cause of action, the burden upon this Respondent and others 
similarly situated is great enough to justify prospective appli-
cation of any change in the fundamental law of consortium 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Court should 
simply recognize that the legislature was within its authority to 
change the common law. This case does, however, present an 
opportunity to clarify and refine the law by recognizing consor-
tium as an element of damage which belongs to the injured 
party. The overruling of prior case law and striking down of 
statutes is a drastic legal step which is unnecessary. 
The action of the District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 1985. 
KLPP MID CHRISTIAN, P.C, 
L^JM^M^^ 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
GREGOR£/>/ SANDERS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitutional Provisions 
All courts shall be openf and every personf for an injury done to 
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall 
not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by 
law. 
Article XVI, Section 5, Utah Constitution. 
Statutes 
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain an 
action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own 
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right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the preserva-
tion and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried* 
There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of 
personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected 
therewith, but the wife may recover against a third person for 
such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall 
include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid or 
assumed by the husband. 
Utah^Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4. 
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in 
conflict with, the Constitution of laws of the United States, or 
the Constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is 
consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is 
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all of this 
state. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-1. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof 
are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this state 
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respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provi-
sions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the 
same matter the rules of equity shall prevail. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2. 
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-2-113. 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless 
made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-105. 
-22-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this £0 day of June, 1985, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Re-
spondent, to: 
Jeffrey 0. Burkhardt 
Samuel King 
Attorneys for Appellant 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
6s/// 
-23-
